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MARK E. STEINER, 
AN HONEST CALLING, THE LAW PRACTICE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2006 
 
REVIEWED BY ROBERT FABRIKANT∗ 
 
This is an important, well-written book on the most important lawyer in 
American history.  Abraham Lincoln’s importance was not as a lawyer, of 
course, but a lawyer he was.  Of the few books that have been written on 
Lincoln as a lawyer and his law practice, this is by far the best one. 
Lincoln’s law practice has no significance apart from the fact that 
Lincoln eventually became perhaps our most important president.  The en-
during value of a book about Lincoln’s law practice would be that it sheds 
light on Lincoln’s character and on his presidency.  If Lincoln had not 
become president, his law practice would not warrant scholarly, or other, 
review.  Steiner concedes as much, but he does not link Lincoln’s law prac-
tice to Lincoln’s presidency.  In particular, Steiner’s excellent review tells 
us little, if anything, about how Lincoln’s law practice might have affected 
Lincoln’s approach to problem-solving and policy-making as president. 
Professor Steiner’s book comes at an especially important time.  First, 
there has been increasing focus paid in recent years on whether Lincoln 
deserves to be called “The Great Emancipator.”  Second, the large collec-
tion of surviving documents from Lincoln’s law practice has recently been 
organized in an accessible form, and Steiner is the first legal scholar to 
analyze the newly organized collection.2  Steiner’s considerable labors have 
produced much food for thought. 
A most welcome feature is Steiner’s approach to Lincoln and his 
manner of practicing law.  Steiner does not sugarcoat Lincoln.  He places 
Lincoln in a rich, historical context.  According to Steiner, Lincoln was the 
quintessential “Whig lawyer.”  By that term, Steiner connotes a lawyer who 
shared the values of the Whig Party in antebellum America.  Principal ele-
ments of Whig philosophy were maintenance of law and order,3 belief in a 
 
 ∗Mr. Fabrikant is a senior counsel in the Washington, D.C. office of Sidley Austin LLP and 
an Adjunct Professor at Howard University School of Law. 
2. The Lincoln Legal Papers Project is housed in Springfield, Illinois. 
3. Though Lincoln most certainly was a “law and order” man, on at least one occasion, 
speaking as a politician, not a lawyer, Lincoln defended the right of a white mob to set on fire a 
black man thought to have killed a white person.  See Phillip Shaw Paludan, Lincoln and Negro 
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free market system, and support of internal economic improvements to pro-
mote growth.  Whig lawyers did not see lawyering or the law as instruments 
of social change.  Rather, they saw the law and the legal system as 
providing “a neutral means to resolve disputes and maintain order.”4 
Steiner believes that a major failing of the Whig value system was that 
it was morally rudderless.  Whig lawyers practiced law with a view towards 
making money, and they did not hesitate to represent clients on either side 
of a dispute.  While Lincoln was less money-oriented than many of his 
peers, it seems that in all other respects he comfortably fit within Steiner’s 
description of a “Whig lawyer.” 
Lincoln’s law practice spanned more than twenty-five years.  He was a 
principal benefactor of the explosive economic growth which overtook the 
country during the first half of the nineteenth century.  Much of this growth 
was fueled by the onset of the railroads.  Lincoln became an important 
lawyer for railroad interests in Illinois, but he also represented many other 
types of clients, including individuals in relatively minor disputes. 
Lincoln’s law practice was what we would consider today to be a 
“general practice.”  He did a considerable amount of trial work, but, accord-
ing to Steiner, Lincoln earned special distinction by arguing cases in front 
of appellate courts throughout Illinois, including the Illinois Supreme Court. 
Lincoln was regarded as an excellent state practitioner, but it is safe to 
say that he did not rank among the top lawyers in the country.  The leading 
lawyers in Lincoln’s time would have included Daniel Webster, Rufus 
Choate, and Henry Clay.  They were archetypical Whig lawyers and would 
have been considered leading lawyers in the country no matter when they 
practiced. 
Lincoln sought to pattern himself after Henry Clay, a senator from 
Kentucky, and a dominant member of the Whig Party.  In contrast to Clay, 
Lincoln was self-schooled in the law, and Lincoln became a politician 
before he became a lawyer.  Lincoln was a member of the Whig party from 
the time he was licensed to practice law in 1837 until the demise of the 
party in 1855.  Lincoln became a leading proponent of the newly formed 
Republican party, which succeeded the Whig party. 
It is probably the case that Lincoln concerned himself more with 
politics than with law, even when he was in law practice.  Law practice was 
simply a means to an end: financing a career in politics.  In contrast to 
 
Slavery: I Haven’t Got Time for the Pain, 27 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 1, 3 (2006), available 
at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jala/27.2/paludan.html. 
4. MARK STEINER, AN HONEST CALLING: THE LAW PRACTICE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 177 
(2006). 
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many other leading lawyers of his day, Lincoln did not use the law as a 
means of achieving social justice.  According to Steiner, Lincoln, like other 
Whig lawyers, was not a legal instrumentalist. 
Assuming Steiner’s characterization of “Whig lawyers” is accurate, it 
is noteworthy that Lincoln markedly changed his stripes when he became 
president.  Lincoln may not have been a legal instrumentalist as a lawyer, 
but he was as a president and commander-in-chief.  A case in point was 
Lincoln’s issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation.  Indeed, the 
Emancipation Proclamation is a prime example of using law as an 
instrument of war. 
Steiner draws an interesting, markedly unfavorable contrast between 
Lincoln, as an archetype of the Whig tradition, and Salmon P. Chase.  
Before Lincoln named Chase as Secretary of the Treasury, and then Chief 
Justice, Chase practiced law in Ohio.  Chase often represented abolitionists 
and fugitive slaves.  This was dangerous business in antebellum America, 
even outside the South.  Chase was sufficiently active in this area that he 
earned the accolade “Attorney General for Fugitive Slaves.”5  Stephen A. 
Douglas derisively referred to Chase as an “Abolition lawyer.”6 
Lincoln opposed slavery, as did Chase, but unlike Chase he did not 
represent fugitive slaves or abolitionists.  Rather, Lincoln, on at least one 
occasion, represented a slave owner seeking to recover slaves who had 
refused to return with him to Kentucky (a slave state) from Illinois.  
Steiner’s treatment of Lincoln’s representation in this infamous case is 
excellent and invaluable.  This portion of Steiner’s book should be required 
reading for lawyers and for Lincoln scholars. 
Lincoln’s representation of the slaveholder has been the subject of 
much discussion, but Steiner’s is the first truly comprehensive treatment.  
He sheds light upon many previously unknown facts and disabuses many of 
the arguments commonly relied upon by Lincoln’s acolytes to defend 
Lincoln’s conduct.  Steiner’s presentation also sheds important new light on 
the depth and quality of Lincoln’s opposition to slavery. 
The Illinois constitution barred slavery, but the Illinois Supreme Court, 
along with the highest courts of many free states, had held that slaves 
voluntarily brought into free states by their owners did not automatically 
become free.7  The status of the slave depended on whether the slaveowner 
 
5. Id. at 129. 
6. Id. at 130. 
7. Willard v. People, 1843 WL 4112, at *3 (Ill. Dec., 1843).  Slaves escaping into a free state 
from a slave state did not become free.  They were subject to recapture under the Fugitive Slave 
Clause and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.  See generally Robert Fabrikant, Emancipation and the 
Proclamation: Of Contrabands, Congress and Lincoln, 49 HOW. L.J. 313, 328-31, 353-58 (2006). 
      
812 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:809 
was merely passing in transit through the state on his way to another state, 
or whether the slaveowner had changed the domicile of the slave from a 
slave state to Illinois.8  In the latter situation the slave would become free 
by operation of the Illinois constitution.  In the former situation, the status 
of the slave would remain unchanged.9  Allowing slaveowners to retain 
their slaves when merely passing through was based on a desire to accom-
modate the slave states and was not compelled by the federal or state 
constitution.  The Illinois Supreme Court believed that this comity-based 
exception did not violate Illinois’ constitutional prohibition against slavery. 
In the fall of 1847, after winning election to Congress, but before 
taking his seat, Lincoln represented Robert Matson, a slave owner from 
Kentucky.  Matson attempted to retrieve a slave and her four slave children.  
He had brought the slaves with him from Kentucky (a slave state) to Illinois 
(a free state).  After slaving on Matson’s farm in Illinois for two years, 
Matson’s five slaves refused to return with him to Kentucky on the ground 
that they were free under the law of Illinois, and they left his custody.  
Matson instituted legal proceedings to repossess the slaves and have them 
return with him to Kentucky.  When Lincoln entered this case, Matson was 
already represented by Usher Linder, a well-known pro-slavery lawyer who 
frequently represented slave owners in Illinois. 
Linder was unsuccessful in reclaiming Matson’s slaves in a county 
district court proceeding.10  Matson’s principal argument was that he had 
brought the slaves into Illinois at their “request . . . on a temporary sojourn 
with the intention of returning to Kentucky.”11  The matter was then heard 
in the county circuit court, and it is at that level that Lincoln became 
involved.  It is not clear how Lincoln was retained by Matson, but Lincoln 
acted as co-counsel with Linder in the circuit court. 
The only issue in the circuit court was whether Matson had brought the 
slaves in “transit,” or whether they had been domiciled in Illinois.  If the 
latter, the slaves were free.  Matson’s sole evidence was a declaration that 
he had brought the slaves into Illinois temporarily.  The court found the 
declaration was self-serving.  The court rightly determined that Matson’s 
conduct spoke louder than his words and concluded that Matson had 
 
8. STEINER, supra note 4, at 116-18. 
9. Id. at 118. 
10. According to Steiner, six years earlier, Linder’s “fiery oratory had helped incite anti-
abolitionist sentiment, leading to the murder of newspaper editor Elijah Lovejoy.”  Id. at 109.  
Linder then “helped prosecute those who had tried to protect Lovejoy’s warehouse against the 
mob and then he helped defend those indicted for Lovejoy’s murder.”  Id. 
11. Id. at 109 (internal citations omitted). 
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forfeited his claim to the slaves’ services by keeping them in Illinois for two 
years.12 
Lincoln’s unsuccessful representation of Matson is often excused by 
Lincoln defenders on several grounds, all of which are refuted by Steiner.  
A standard explanation for Lincoln’s decision to represent Matson is that it 
reflected Lincoln’s belief that he, along with other northerners, was duty-
bound to assist in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Clause (FSC) and its 
implementing legislation.13  This was an outgrowth of Lincoln’s view that 
FSC reflected a compromise necessary for the creation of the country itself.  
But the FSC was not at issue in the Matson case because the five slaves had 
not escaped from a slave state into a non-slave state.  Rather, Matson had 
voluntarily brought the slaves into Illinois.  Their escape was intra-state, not 
interstate.  Accordingly, the slaves’ fate was determined by state, not 
federal, law. 
The significance of the fact that the FSC was not implicated in Matson 
cannot be overstated in terms of evaluating Lincoln’s conduct.  Reprehen-
sible as it was, lawyers representing slaveowners seeking to recover fugitive 
slaves could rationalize their conduct on the ground that they were simply 
acting to protect slavery in states where it was protected under the federal 
Constitution.  They were doing no more than what was necessary to support 
the Constitution.  This followed from the then-accepted notion that the Con-
stitution protected slavery in the states where it already existed, and the 
FSC and its implementing legislation were necessary incidents to that Con-
stitutional protection.  Though slaveholder representations in support of the 
FSC may be seen as signifying an implicit endorsement of slavery in slave 
states, they did not signify an attempt to introduce slavery into a free state. 
But the Matson case did not involve an attempt to protect slavery in a 
state where it already existed and was constitutionally protected.  Illinois 
was a free state.  The judicially created rule which permitted slaveowners to 
retain property rights in slaves taken in transitu, was a comity-based excep-
tion to the Illinois constitution.  It was not compelled by the federal or state 
constitution.  One would have thought that a lawyer who believed slavery 
was immoral (and economically backward) would not have accepted 
representations which sought to vindicate or expand the in transitu 
exception.  To do so would have had the effect of allowing slavery, though 
 
12. Id. at 121. 
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.  The two pieces of implementing legislation were the 
1793 Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, and the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, 9 Stat. 462, (repealed 
by Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 15 Stat. 200). 
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perhaps in a truncated form, to exist in Illinois.  This is plainly the upshot of 
Matson’s position in his attempt to recover the five slaves. 
The five slaves Matson sought to recover had indisputably performed 
slave labor for Matson in Illinois for two or more years.  Matson’s 
lawyers14 were espousing the view that a Kentucky slaveowner had the 
right not merely to pass through a free state with his slaves, but to engage 
them in slave labor for at least two years along the way.  This was not an 
indirect endorsement of slavery in Kentucky; it was tantamount to 
condoning slavery in a free state. 
Indeed, Matson’s lawyers appear to have sought a pro-slavery expan-
sion of the in transitu exception under Illinois law.  In 1843, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that “a slave does not become free by the Constitution 
of Illinois by coming into the State for the mere purpose of passage through 
it.”15  The court did not there lay out the evidentiary framework for estab-
lishing the slaveowner’s “purpose” in bringing the slave into Illinois.  Most 
assuredly, though, the court did not state that the slaveowner’s purpose was 
determined solely by what the slaveowner said his purpose was in bringing 
the slave into the state.  If that were the case, a slaveowner could dictate the 
outcome of the case simply by submitting self-serving declarations. 
But this was precisely the position of Matson’s lawyers.  They argued 
that Matson’s stated intent was controlling as to whether the slaves were 
brought into the state for the mere purpose of passage through it.  This was 
tantamount to asking the court to disregard the fact that Matson had kept the 
slaves in Illinois for more than two years.  The court correctly rejected the 
argument that Matson’s stated intent was controlling and found that his 
declaration was not credible in light of the more than two years he had kept 
his slaves in Illinois. 
In evaluating Lincoln’s representation of Matson it is important to keep 
in mind that Lincoln had three distinct, though related, objections to 
slavery.  First, he thought it immoral, both for the slaveowners and the 
slaves themselves.  Second, he thought slavery was economically ineffi-
cient.  Third, it deprived whites of economic opportunity.  The Matson case 
did not involve a situation in which these multifaceted detriments of slavery 
were being cabined in slave states.  Rather, it involved an effort to counte-
nance the presence of slavery, and all of its evils, outside of the area 
 
14. It is not clear whether Linder or Lincoln, or both, advanced these arguments.  There are 
no genuinely contemporaneous accounts of arguments made by the lawyers or transcript of the 
proceedings.  STEINER, supra note 4, at 119-20.  It seems safe to say that Lincoln either advanced 
these arguments or knowingly associated himself with these arguments.  Id. at 120 (“Linder and 
Lincoln argued that Matson’s declaration controlled the question of intent.”). 
15. Id. at 117 (citation omitted). 
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Lincoln believed had been constitutionally quarantined.  It is inexplicable 
that Lincoln would allow the poison of slavery to seep into his home state 
any more than was constitutionally necessary to support the FSC.16 
Lincoln’s representation of Matson raises the question of Lincoln’s 
view of the relationship of morals to a lawyer’s law practice.  Steiner makes 
the case that Whig lawyers saw no connection between law and morality 
and that this approach reflected the professional mores of the time.  Steiner 
acknowledges, however, that many lawyers of that era conducted their law 
practices with a view towards morality as well as to their purse.  It is not 
easy to place Lincoln along that continuum because he at one point stated, 
“a moral tone ought to be infused into the profession.”17  Lincoln’s repre-
sentation of Matson certainly did not live up to that command. 
Lincoln’s representation of Matson is often excused on the ground that 
Lincoln was not endorsing the morality of the result his client was attempt-
ing to achieve.  Steiner resists this argument, largely by comparing Lincoln 
to Chase.  He understates the matter by concluding that Lincoln’s represen-
tation of Matson “shows the corrupting influence of a [Whig] legal ethic 
that minimized moral responsibility.”18 
Lincoln’s law practice may have been “an honest calling,” but Steiner 
convincingly demonstrates that honesty is a necessary but not sufficient 
characteristic for a lawyer.  It is also the case that Lincoln’s law practice did 
not provide a basis for predicting how he would discharge his duties as 
president and commander-in-chief.  Steiner’s book is nonetheless worth 
reading because it is the most comprehensive account yet of an important 
era in the professional life of an exceedingly important president. 
 
 
16. Lincoln’s legal position in Matson was, of course, contrary to the criticism he later made 
of Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in the Dred Scott case.  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 
(1857).  “[W]hat Dred Scott’s master might lawfully do with Dred Scott, in the free state of 
Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in 
Illinois, or in any other free state.”  STEINER, supra note 4, at 120 (citation omitted).  Lincoln’s 
Speech at Springfield, Illinois, (June 16, 1858), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 461, 464-65 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953-1990) (“House Divided Speech”). 
17. STEINER, supra note 4, at 135. 
18. Id. at 136. 
